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“[In European private law], there is the need of a coherent overall framework into 
which single decisions may be integrated constructively.” 
Ernst Steindorff 1 
Summary 
It is common ground that in the EU the role of adjudication has always been, 
and continues to be, more important than in the Member States as the degree of 
political consensus is much more limited at European level. Therefore, issues 
which could be decided politically in the Member States had to be solved le-
gally in the European context. At the same time, the authority and legitimacy 
of European court decisions is more fragile than that of national ones – not 
only as the EU crucially depends on the collaboration of national administra-
tions and courts for the effective implementation and enforcement of its legal 
system, but also because the legitimacy of the EU itself as a political entity is 
more fragile than that of European Nation States, most of which are firmly 
rooted in democratic traditions and enjoy a considerable degree of political 
stability. 
These weaknesses notwithstanding, legal integration in the EC has been a 
long success story reconstructed by Joseph Weiler and others. Judicial activism 
led to important progress of the integration process not only in the foundation-
ary period, but also in the years of political stagnation after the 1967 crisis and 
after the relance of the integration process following the Single Market project 
1985. This kind of activism primarily relates to the constitutional foundations 
of the EC: the structural constitution (i.e. the relationship of European and na-
tional law including the famous doctrines of direct effect, supremacy, state li-
ability), the substantive constitution (mainly composed of the basic market 
freedoms, competition law, and the protection of human rights) and the institu-
tional constitution (setting forth the competencies and the rules of interaction 
of the various European institutions). In these fields, the ECJ has successfully 
developed the treaties into a full and mostly coherent constitutional system. On 
the whole, these developments have met the acceptance of Member States and 
enjoy a sufficient degree of legitimacy. This is probably so because they are 
primarily related to the initial project of market integration through the aboli-
tion of national restrictions and the establishment of a system of undistorted 
                                                 
1  E. Steindorff, EG-Vertrag und Privatrecht, (Baden-Baden: Nomos,1996), at 471. 
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competition – on which there was an initial consensus of all Member States 
and which has in most cases led to economic benefits for a majority of them. In 
the case of human rights protection, this only replicated a more or less com-
mon standard reflecting common historical and cultural heritage and achieve-
ments. 
Yet, in other areas – specifically in areas covered by European secondary 
legislation, which the ECJ is bound to administer so to speak as an ordinary 
court – European adjudication has proven to be far less successful. This is par-
ticularly true for the field of European private law which is a relative new-
comer to legal harmonisation policy. European private law is characterised by 
selective European acts limited in scope which aim in most cases at consumer 
protection and which have to co-exist with a more or less coherent and encom-
passing body of national law (“islands and archipelagos in an ocean”). In this 
constellation, numerous problems exist: First, one finds problems of access and 
effectiveness of justice, as the most frequent preliminary reference procedure 
usually lasts more than 2 years and only provides interpretations of European 
law, without resolving the case – which frequently leads to a “ping-pong” 
game between European and national courts to the detriment of the parties 
which has lasted in some cases more than 10 years. Moreover, we are con-
fronted with quality problems, as it becomes ever more apparent that the ECJ 
judges cannot deal convincingly, without a meaningful degree of specialisa-
tion, with all legal matters ranging from constitutional to company and tax law. 
More generally, the usual methodological style of the ECJ, a combination be-
tween legal formalism and effet utile-oriented interpretation, is not suited to 
private law, whose essential task is to balance opposed interests among the 
parties in a just way. This is particularly so as the overall effects of the com-
bined application of European and national law – which alone determines the 
outcome of a case – is almost never considered by the ECJ which limits itself 
to the interpretation of European law only. But there are more structural prob-
lems related to the specific characteristics of the field. Due to the fragmenta-
tion of European sources, decisions on European acts in private law often con-
cern their scope of applicability and do not lead, unlike in national law, to an 
ever more precise and coherent systematisation of the field. Specifically, the 
ECJ is not well suited to decide on dispositive law issues, which typically do 
not reflect public policy matters, but consists of a balancing of party interests. 
This requires significant knowledge of the social and economic context of spe-
cific types of transactions – knowledge which the ECJ frequently lacks. Taken 
together, these problems render the effectiveness and legitimacy of European 
adjudication in private law thin in many instances. 
A way out from this dilemma is not easy to design in general terms. How-
ever, basic provisos may still be formulated: The ECJ should handle private 
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law with caution and more often resort to judicial self restraint. It should be 
aware of the fact that it is not the suitable court to do the fine-tuning in private 
law systems and to deliver private law justice (mostly commutative and only 
exceptionally distributive justice). Correspondingly, it should limit itself to 
implementing basic European principles such as market freedoms and human 
rights, and to instigating and monitoring learning and rationalisation processes 
in national law (a “procedural” function). Moreover, it should systematically 
reflect the consequences of its decisions resulting from the combined applica-
tion of European and national law. In short, one might say that it is by behav-
ing like a constitutional court for private law that the ECJ might replicate its 
constitutional law success story there. 
I.  Introduction 
The notion of judicial governance addresses the prominent phenomenon of 
courts assuming tasks which are, under the classic separation of powers doc-
trine, reserved to the executive and legislative power.2 Yet, the phenomenon of 
activist courts does not amount to an anomaly, but instead reflects the very na-
ture of adjudication. This is so for both methodological and social reasons. 
Methodologically, there is no clear borderline between the application of the 
law and its creative development; the application of general norms to specific 
fact patterns always adds new meaning to them. Socially, adjudication is al-
ways embedded in a wider societal context and is, therefore, always influenced 
by the political, economic and social circumstances under which it operates 
and which influence the minds of jurists and inform their decisions. Such in-
fluence is not undesirable, but is instead indispensable in order to adapt the law 
to its changing social environment. Thus, there is no clear borderline between 
judicial and political governance. Accordingly, modern governance theory is 
right in assessing both of them from the perspective of the general theoretical 
criteria of effectiveness and legitimacy.3 
                                                 
2  See, for example, M. Cappelletti, Giudici legislatori? (Milan: Giuffrè, 1984); M. 
Shapiro & A. Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics, and Judicialisation, (Oxford: OUP, 
2002); for a recent view from the European Court of Justice itself, see K. Schiemann, 
Judicial governance – a judge’s perspective, in: A. Furrer (ed.), Europäisches Privat-
recht im rechtswissenschaftlichen Diskurs (Bern: Stämpfli, 2006), at 1. 
3  F. Scharpf, Regieren in Europa, (Frankfurt aM: Hofmann & Campe, 1999); idem., 
Notes Toward a Theory of Multilevel Governing in Europe, MPIfG Discussion Paper 
2000 No. 5. 
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Whereas the role of judicial governance is clearly less significant than po-
litical governance in the Member States, this is not necessarily so in the Euro-
pean context where judicial activism has reached a novel, historically un-
known, dimension.4 Here, the role of adjudication has always been much more 
important than in the Member States, as the degree of political consensus is 
much more limited. Thus, issues which could be decided politically have had – 
and often still have – to be solved legally in the European context.5 In filling 
this “decision-making gap”, the ECJ has famously implemented a strongly 
European agenda and become the motor of the integration process even in 
years of political stagnation, by gradually developing the European treaties 
into a federal, or as many prefer to say today, multi-level constitution.6 As im-
pressively reconstructed by Joseph Weiler and others,7 judicial constitution-
building has extended to the structural constitution (i.e., the relationship of 
European and national law, including the famous doctrines of direct effect, su-
premacy and state liability), the substantive constitution (mainly composed of 
the free trade provisions converted into the basic market freedoms by the 
Court, competition law, and the protection of human rights invented by the 
Court), and the institutional constitution (setting forth the competencies and 
the rules of interaction of the various European institutions). On the whole, de-
spite the occasional resistance of national high or constitutional courts in the 
fields of competences and human rights,8 these instances of judicial govern-
ance have met the acceptance of Member States and the legal community.9 
This is probably so because they are primarily related to the initial European 
project of market integration through the abolition of national restrictions and 
the establishment of a system of undistorted competition – on which there has 
always been the firm consensus of all the Member States and which has in 
                                                 
4  See, generally, J.H.H. Weiler, “The Community System: The Dual Character of Su-
pranationalism”, (1981) 1 YEL at 267; idem, “A Quiet Revolution: The ECJ and its In-
terlocutors”, (1994) 25 Comparative Political Studies at 510. 
5  C.-D. Ehlermann, “The European Community, Its Laws and Lawyers”, (1992) 29 
CMLR at 213. 
6  E. Stein, “Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution”, (1981) 
75 AJIL at 1. 
7  J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: Do the new clothes have an emperor? and 
other essays on European integration, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). 
8 See, for example, Ch. Schmid, Multi-Level Constitutionalism and Constitutional Con-
flicts. Interconnecting the National, European and International Economic Constitu-
tions in the Banana Dispute, 311 pp., Ph.D.-Thesis, EUI Florence, 2002. 
9  See, generally, A.-M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet & J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), The Euro-
pean Courts and national courts: doctrine and jurisprudence (Oxford: Hart Publish-
ing, 1998). 
  5
most cases led to economic benefits for a majority of them. In the case of hu-
man rights protection, this only replicated a more or less common standard 
which reflected the common historical and cultural heritage, and achievements 
such as the ECHR, and thus did not meet with strong criticism. 
However, alongside the ECJ’s function of a motor of integration and of a 
constitutional court, its role as an ordinary court has, since 1985, become in-
creasingly important. The Single Market Programme entailed the introduction 
of qualified-majority voting and of new institutional arrangements. These 
changes ended the former institutional lourdeur of the EC’s political branch 
and enabled the proliferation of European legislation in many fields of eco-
nomic and social regulation. Given its central role as the guardian of all Euro-
pean law, these new fields had and have to be administered by the ECJ as well. 
The example chosen for analysis here is private law, which is a relative new-
comer among European legal disciplines and has developed only slowly since 
1985, though at greater speed in recent years. In this field, European adjudica-
tion has proven to be far less successful than in constitutional law, and raises 
serious problems of effectiveness and legitimacy.10 
This contribution aims to explain this phenomenon by comparing judicial 
governance in European constitutional and private law (Section II). Specifi-
cally, we will distinguish differences regarding the systematic state of the leg-
islation (1), interpretative meta-principles and legal method (2), and the effects 
on private parties in terms of judicial protection (3). As a result, it will be 
shown that in general constitutional and private law adjudication displays 
meaningful differences which necessitate a completely new alternative ap-
proach. Yet this approach may be borrowed, albeit in an adapted form, from a 
specific line of constitutional adjudication which is based on reflexive balanc-
ing (III). 
                                                 
10  See, generally, Ch. Joerges, “Rethinking European Law’s Supremacy”, EUI Working 
Paper Law No. 2005/12; idem, “Der Europäisierungsprozess als Herausforderung des 
Privatrechts: Plädoyer für eine neue Rechts-Disziplin”, ZERP-Diskussionspapier 
1/2006; Ch. Jetzlsperger, “Legitimacy through Jurisprudence”, EUI Working Paper 
Law No. 2003/12. 
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II.  A Comparison between Constitutional and Private Law 
Adjudication 
1. Systematic State of the Legislation 
Generally, the term “system” refers to the idealist-type features of unity and 
order.11 Unity may be understood as completeness, order as coherence, i.e., the 
absence of contradictions. The legal system of a polity – which may be divided 
into sub-systems including private and constitutional law – constitutes the 
methodological paradigm, as it were, for the enactment of law by the legislator 
and its interpretation by courts: The external system is based on the abstract 
ordering concepts of a legal text (for example, contract or tort), reflects its 
structure and serves the meaningful order of the legal material.12 Continental 
codifications are often perceived of as realisations par excellence of an exter-
nal system, but it is important to note that an external system underlies any le-
gal instrument. The teleological complement of the external system is the in-
ternal system. This is based on the idea of consistency with fundamental values 
and principles, and thus constitutes a teleological order, whose most abstract 
components are general principles of law.13 In private law, the most important 
ones are autonomy and solidarity, from which more precise principles may be 
derived in a “genealogic tree-kind” of fashion.14 The existence of internal co-
herence is the most important precondition for courts to treat equal things 
equally – and thus to realise the ultimate aim of all law, that of justice. 
It lies in the very nature of law as a social medium exposed to constant so-
cial change that a legal system designed by the legislator is never fully com-
plete, and always needs to be concretised and complemented by the courts, so 
as to provide answers to specific cases. Normally, however, systems or sub-
systems designed by the legislator possess at least a certain degree of com-
pleteness. By this, we do not mean completeness at the level of norms (which 
would indeed mean that each factual situation would be covered by a norm) 
but of principles. This follows from the fact that national systems typically 
cover entire areas of law, for example, contract or tort in a private law codifi-
                                                 
11 On the following, see the classic accounts by C.-W. Canaris, Systemdenken und Sys-
tembegriff in der Jurisprudenz, 2nd ed., (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1983), at 19 et 
seq., and F. Bydlinski, System und Prinzipien des Privatrechts, (Vienna, New York: 
Springer, 1996), at 1 et seq. 
12  The distinction between external and internal systems goes back to Ph. Heck, Be-
griffsbildung und Interessenjurisprudenz, (Tübingen: Mohr, 1932). 
13 Canaris, supra, at 40 et seq. 
14 Canaris, supra, at 52 et seq. 
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cation, without any deliberate exemptions in scope. In theses areas, courts may 
uncover encompassing sets of guiding principles beneath the existing norms. 
When dealing with new situations not directly regulated by existing norms, 
courts can thus complete the legislator’s “master plan”, i.e., develop their rea-
soning on the basis of the existing principles which are balanced against each 
other. By doing so, the legal system is, in turn, “woven tighter” by each and 
every decision. It is precisely this feature which is critical in European law. On 
account of its relative incompleteness, European law always needs to be com-
plemented by national law in order to function effectively. However, there are 
significant differences between single fields in terms of completeness, in par-
ticular, between constitutional and private law. 
a) Constitutional Law 
It is true that the EC Treaty was, and, even after many reforms, still is, incom-
plete and sketchy on many issues. However, a basic systematic structure ex-
isted in most fields, which enabled the Court to develop them gradually by 
means of relatively coherent reasoning. In the substantive constitution, the 
provisions on free trade were developed from commands directed to Member 
States, firstly, into subjective rights which excluded discrimination, then into 
prohibitions of limitations and positive action commands, and finally were 
even extended horizontally, i.e., among private parties. Yet, in all these phases, 
the Court was able to follow a relatively coherent overall logic which it could 
often borrow from the similar methodological developments of national human 
rights.15 
Only at first glance does the structural constitution constitute an exception. 
Thus, the crucial questions of direct effect and supremacy were not settled in 
the Treaties, but were solved by the ECJ distinguishing the EC treaties from 
traditional public international law instruments – under which supremacy is 
also the rule, but is not generally effective without direct effect, which consti-
tutes a rare exception there. Thus, notwithstanding the politically revolutionary 
character of doing so, in methodologically terms, the ECJ just had to convert 
the public international law exception into a new European law rule. Combined 
with the universally recognised principles of venire factum proprium in the 
Roman law tradition which is similar to estoppel in the Common Law, the 
same reasoning could be applied to justify direct effect of directives.16 
                                                 
15 Ch. Schmid, Die Instrumentalisierung des Privatrechts durch die EU, (typescript, 
Munich, 2004), 125 et seq., 159 et seq., 202 et seq., & 273 et seq. 
16 Ch. Schmid, supra 15, 118 et seq., 145 et seq., 198 et seq., 253 et seq. 
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Against this background, the methodologically most revolutionary instance 
of law-making in the field of constitutional law was probably the state liability 
doctrine which the ECJ deduced from nothing more than “the system of the 
Treaty”.17 Admittedly, this doctrine has models in the national law of all Euro-
pean countries, encompasses a much more limited field than, say, contract law, 
and is therefore easier to design systematically. But still, also due to the limited 
number of cases referred, the ECJ was not able to elaborate the doctrine into a 
complete sub-system. Instead, among the elements for a liability claim, only 
the violation of a right guaranteed in EC law has been defined exhaustively at 
European level, whereas both the causality and the scope of the recoverable 
damage still need to be defined to a certain extent by national law, which is re-
sorted to for the purpose of gap filling.18 However, the ECJ controls whether 
the national provisions enable the effective implementation of European provi-
sos, and by doing so, demands selective changes of national law (mainly the 
inapplication of provisions, or parts thereof, which might hamper the effective 
implementation of European law). Taken together, state liability law in Europe 
constitutes a complex mixture of European and national law. However, its ever 
more elaborate development by means of European adjudication is possible 
and is not excluded on grounds of competence. Moreover, on account of the 
somewhat general character of its own previous rulings, the ECJ is not bound 
to give answers to marginal details, but may pick and choose key issues and 
decide on the intensity of European intervention according to its own overall 
conception (“master plan”) of the field.19 
All in all, constitutional law adjudication may in most cases be based on a 
sufficiently elaborate systematic structure which allows the ECJ to develop and 
gradually refine a coherent system according to a relatively consistent overall 
concept. 
b) Private law 
The situation is quite different in European private law, the bulk of which sails 
under the consumer law flag.20 European consumer law directives cover not 
                                                 
17  Case C-6/90 and C 9/90, Francovich, ECR 1991, 5537. See, for example, in English 
R. Caranta, “Judicial Protection against Member States: A New Jus Commune takes 
Shape”, (1995) 32 CMLR at 703. 
18 See, for details, W. Wurmnest, Grundzüge eines europäischen Haftungsrechts (Tü-
bingen: Mohr, 2003), at 43 et seq. 
19  In this sense, see M. Herdegen & Th. Rensmann, “Die neuen Konturen der gemein-
schaftlichen Staatshaftung“, (1997) 161 ZHR at 522. 
20  For an overview, see S. Weatherill, “Consumer Policy”, in: P. Craig & G. de Búrca 
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only many different types of transactions, such as doorstep sales,21 consumer 
credit,22 distance sales,23 package tours,24 and time-sharing rights,25 as well as 
single fields of tort law, such as product liability.26 Also, there are two impor-
tant directives with a larger scope of application, namely, the unfair terms di-
rective,27 and the consumer sales directive.28 
Moreover, there are private law acts based on other treaty objectives, such 
as the late payment directive29 (internal market and Small and Medium sized 
Enterprises), the commercial agents directive,30 and a set of banking and in-
surance law provisions. Beyond this, there are plans of a wider and more sys-
tematically coherent contract law instrument, which is currently being elabo-
rated as a soft law “common framework of reference” and might one day be-
come the core of a European Civil Code – but these plans have not, of course, 
affected standing law up until now. To sum up, there is, to date, still only a 
limited coverage of contract law, which is mainly covered by European con-
sumer law instruments, which resemble, so to speak, European islands or, per-
                                                                                                                                                      
(eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, (Oxford: OUP, 2000), at 693. 
21  Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of 
contracts negotiated away from business premises, 1985 O.J. (L 372) 31. 
22  Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regu-
lations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer 
credit, 1987 O.J. (L 042) 48 (as modified by Directives 90/88/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 061) 
14, and 98/7/EEC, 1998 O.J. (L 101) 17. 
23  Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on 
the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19. 
24  Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and pack-
age tours, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 59. 
25  Directive 94/47/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 October 1994 
on the protection of purchasers in respect of certain aspects of contracts relating to the 
purchase of the right to use immovable properties on a timeshare basis, 1994 O.J. (L 
280) 83. 
26  Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective 
products, 1988 O.J. (L 307) 54 (amended by Directive 1999/34/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 1999, 1999 O.J. (L 283) 20). 
27  Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, 1993 O.J. 
(L 095) 29. 
28  Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 
on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees, 1999 O.J. 
(L 171) 12. 
29  Directive 2000/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2000 
on combating late payment in commercial transactions, 2000 O.J. (L 200) 35. 
30  Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the co-ordination of the laws of the 
Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents, 1986 O.J. (L 382) 17. 
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haps, archipelagos, in an ocean of national law. 
From a system based-perspective, there are several problems in this situa-
tion: first, there are coherence problems among different European sources, 
which include the “one-sided teleology” of European instruments (aa) as well 
as coherence problems in the interplay of European and national sources (bb). 
aa) Internal coherence problems 
First, there are technical problems of coherence within EC law.31 In fact, there 
are lots of gaps, frictions and exemptions within single instruments, which are 
caused by their sectoral regulatory approach and political compromise. For ex-
ample, the product liability directive defines its central notions of defect and 
damage only in a fragmentary way. The same is true for issues of causality, 
concurring liability and the scope of recoverable damage. But there are more 
artificial limitations, such as Article 9 para. 1 lit. b) of the Product Liability Di-
rective which lays down a lower threshold for the awarding of damages, which 
entails that courts must also always examine a case according to national law – 
as denying a claim below the lower threshold would amount to a denial of jus-
tice. 
More coherence problems are created by the different use of identical ter-
minology. Thus, as mentioned above, the notion of damage is defined only 
vaguely in the Product Liability and the Commercial Agents’ Directives, but 
not even that vague definition is uniform. In this context, the AG has, in the 
Leitner32 Case, implicitly invoked the topos of the “interpretative unity of EC 
law”. This postulate is not, however, tenable, as identical notions may be, and 
frequently are, used with different objectives, in particular, when they are used 
in primary and secondary law. More pressing than the terminology problem is 
the often missing co-ordination among related European instruments which 
may be applicable to similar fact patterns. Such friction may be of a technical 
or, additionally, of a conceptual nature. Thus, without any justification being 
given by the European legislator, there are different time-frames and modes of 
calculation of these for the revocation of a contract according to the Door step, 
the Time-sharing and the Distance Sales Directives. This problem is aggra-
vated by the finding in the Travel Vac33 Decision, according to which several 
directives may be applicable cumulatively. The laudable tentative of the Ger-
                                                 
31  On the following, see Ch. Schmid, supra 15, 597 et seq. 
32  Case C-168/00, Leitner, ECR 2002, I-2631 = NJW 2002, 1244 with comment K. Ton-
ner & B. Lindner, (2002) NJW at 1475. 
33  Case C-423/97, Travel Vac, ECR 1999, I-2195. 
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man legislator to harmonise these time-frames in § 355 para. 3 BGB under the 
so-called minimum harmonisation principle (according to which a national leg-
islator may unilaterally opt for a higher degree of consumer protection) has 
been dismissed by the ECJ in the Heininger34 decision, which excludes the 
prescription of revocation rights in the event that the consumer was not prop-
erly informed about it. This decision is, unfortunately, in line with the general 
strategy of abolishing minimum harmonisation clauses which the Commission 
has espoused in its recent strategy papers and in the Directive on Distance 
Sales of Financial Services.35 Whilst the gain in terms of uniform market con-
ditions will be limited on account of the fragmented state of European legisla-
tion, the loss of “coherence resources” by the national legislator in the imple-
mentation stage will be considerable. 
Whereas the coherence problems just mentioned have a more technical na-
ture, there are even more serious conflicts caused by conceptual contradictions, 
in particular, by what may be called the one-sided teleology of European in-
struments. To explain this problem, one needs to establish a basic comparison 
between the concept of classic (national) and European private law. Classic 
private law is based on three fundamental concepts: freedom and equality of all 
citizens, and justice as the key criterion to govern legal relationships – which, 
in private law, predominantly means commutative, not distributive justice.36 
Freedom and equality require that every human being be capable of participat-
ing in legal relationships at his or her will and on equal terms. Capacity is no 
longer restricted, and there is no longer privileged treatment of certain indi-
viduals or social classes – in short, private law takes on a universal character. 
In its strong version, commutative justice means that the exchange of perform-
ances in contract law and the redress of damages in tort law should be equiva-
lent; in its weaker and perhaps more important version, it means that private 
law relationships should be governed only by criteria which originates in the 
relationship between the parties themselves – and not by reference to external 
political, social or economic goals. To sum up, classic private law is funda-
                                                 
34  Case C-481/99, Heininger, ECR 2001, I-234. For an instructive comment, see M. 
Franzen, “’Heininger’ und die Folgen: ein Lehrstück zum Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht”, 
(2003) JZ at 321; in English: G.-P. Calliess, “The Limits of Eclecticism in Consumer 
Law: National Struggles and the Hope for a coherent European Contract Law. A 
Comment on the ECJ’s and the German Federal Highcourts’s ‘Heininger‘-decisions”, 
GermanLawJournal.com 3 (2002) No. 8. 
35  Directive No. 2002/65/EEC, OJ EC 2002 (L 271) 16. 
36  On commutative and distributive justice in modern private law, see C.-W. Canaris, 
Die Bedeutung der iustitia distributiva im deutschen Vertragsrecht (Munich: Beck, 
1997); H. Collins, “Distributive justice through contracts”, (1992) 45 Current Legal 
Problems at 49. 
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mentally about the balancing of interests between two or several parties. 
By contrast, the conceptual basis of European private law always resides in 
integration policies – consumer policy being the most frequent case – which 
are not primarily governed by the interests of the parties, but by some collec-
tive interest of integration. From the outset, such a one-sided teleological con-
cept (which the ECJ usually hastens to realise in its case law) is an ill-suited 
basis for a Court to balance the interests of two or more parties in a just way. 
Things are worse when two collective interests concepts collide, as may, for 
example, happen with the Late Payment Directive,37 which aims to support 
SME, and the consumer directives which contain consumer protection instru-
ments – which typically act against traders including SME. In the provisions of 
the Late Payment Directive such conflicts are counteracted by the exemption 
of consumer transactions from its scope of application. However, through a 
minimum harmonisation clause, it does allow for stricter national standards of 
protection of SME. This has, for example, enabled German law to extend its 
scope of application to all kinds of transactions, including consumer transac-
tions.38 These contradictory minimum harmonisation clauses constitute noth-
ing less than the declaration of bankruptcy of a private law which wants to pro-
tect everyone against everyone, instead of focussing on its principal task of 
balancing competing interests in a way which is fair and just. As a result, the 
one-sided teleology of this legislation renders coherent jurisprudence difficult 
from the outset. 
bb) Coherence problems in the interplay of European and national sources 
(1) General observations 
Even more serious coherence problems exist in the interplay of European and 
national sources.39 This vertical conflict of laws scenario leads to a European-
national multilevel arrangement that no longer deserves to be called a system. 
Instead, the gaze of the person applying the law must, to alter Karl Engisch’s 
famous formulation, continually shift back and forth between the various strata 
of law in order to disclose possible overlaps between national law and Com-
munity law – often hard to find, given that they are systematically designed 
differently.40 The ordering function of the external system is lost here. It is 
                                                 
37  OJ EC 2000 (L 200) 35. 
38  For details, see A. Colombi Ciacchi, “Die EG-Richtlinie über den Zahlungsverzug und 
ihre Umsetzung durch das Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz”, (2002) EWS at 306. 
39  On the following, see Schmid, supra 15, 622 et seq. 
40  Similarly, in the light of the lack of foreseeability of EC law interventions into na-
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thus quite likely that possibly relevant European provisions are simply over-
looked in practice. In contrast to the relationship between national special pri-
vate laws and general private law, the concurrent norms are not associated with 
each other conceptually or systematically. Nor are whole areas of law which 
normally have a relatively clearly-definable scope of application regulated by 
special laws,41 in contrast to the interplay of substantive uniform law such as 
the 1980 United Nations Sales Law Convention (CISG) and national law. In-
stead, Community law and national law co-exist in the closest possible contact 
within the same regulatory area. 
It is in the nature of things that this co-existence entails severe disruptions 
of the internal system of (national) private law. When superimposed by Com-
munity law, national legal systems become permeated by European norms 
which are underlain with differing teleologies or general principles of law, and, 
accordingly, often act as foreign bodies therein. Complicated contradictions in 
valuations and unforeseen constraints to co-ordination in casu are the unavoid-
able consequence of this situation.42 The rule of interpretation of national law 
in conformity with EC directives means that co-ordination problems of this na-
ture can arise within national law, too, namely, between harmonized and non-
harmonized parts. It is particularly hard to grasp and deal with these when, as 
usually happens, European and national mixtures appear within the same stat-
ute or even within the same provision. Indeed, it usually cannot be seen in the 
national law – and often not even from the more easily accessible secondary 
literature – which provisions or parts of them have a transposing function.43 
The more-or-less random encounter of unco-ordinated strata of law differ-
entiates the European multilevel system from continental systems and even 
                                                                                                                                                      
tional legal system, which is particularly strong in private law, Thomas Wilhelmson 
refers to a “Jack-in-the-box effect” of Community law; see Th. Wilhelmson, “Private 
Law in the EU: Harmonized or Fragmented Europeanization?”, (2002) 10 Eur. R. Pri-
vate L. at 77. 
41  See Ch. Schmid, Das Zusammenspiel von Einheitlichem UN-Kaufrecht und nationa-
lem Recht, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996). 
42  Thus penetratingly put by P. Hommelhoff, “Zivilrecht unter dem Einfluß europäischer 
Rechtsangleichung”, (1992) 192 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis at 71 & 102; Ch. 
Joerges, “Die Europäisierung des Privatrechts als Rationalisierungsprozeß und als 
Streit der Disziplinen”, (1995) 5 Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 181 at 199. 
43 German law, in official notes, only indicates those sections of a statute which have the 
function of implementing European directives. Thus, a note on the new German sales 
law just says that the present section (§§ 433-480 BGB) serves to implement the con-
sumer sales directive. This is far too little specific to serve as guidance for the inter-
pretation of single provisions or parts thereof. See, on this topic, M. Lutter, “Die Aus-
legung angeglichenen Rechts“, (1992) Juristenzeitung at 593. 
  14
from the Common Law. Whilst, famously, the latter also consists of fragmen-
tary, overlapping “strata of law” (common law in the narrower sense, equity 
and statutes from various periods),44 new statutes are normally conceptually 
and systematically harmonized with old law by the legislator, and new case 
law regularly develops consistently out of the old. In contrast, in the European 
multilevel system, a consistent co-ordination of various sources can no longer 
be established within a single system or by its courts, alone. Instead, following 
Kelsen’s famous quotation from the Bible, European private law and the law-
yers dealing with it have to “serve several masters”,45 whose spheres of influ-
ence are monitored by independent courts. Furthermore, the interplay of 
Community law and national law is inadequately “processed” by case law. As 
we know, there are only two European Courts, of which only the ECJ deals 
with European private law, and not even in concentrated fashion. Whereas dis-
ruptive elements of national special legislation are “compatibilized” relatively 
quickly with the overall system through case law and jurisprudential writings, 
in European private law to date, there are simply too few court decisions to ac-
complish this. 
Last but not least, due to the limited coverage of private law and the prob-
lems of internal coherence just mentioned, ECJ decisions involve little system-
atic gain. The vast majority of them concern the delimitation of the scope of 
application of European instruments, without a final decision on the merits of 
the case being taken. To quote just one example, in the Easy Car Decision,46 
the ECJ decided that car hire contracts were no services contracts in the sense 
of Art. 3 para. 2 of the Distance Sales Directive (with the main effect that the 
revocation right contained in this directive did not apply), but that the case was 
to be left to national law. Similar questions could be asked about a high num-
ber of other types of contracts. Yet, the answers to this question do not develop 
the system very much, they do not concern the basic task of private law, i.e., 
that of refining and concretising the balancing of competing party interests. In 
short, such procedures not only entail no meaningful systematic gains, but also 
delay the rendering of justice to the parties. 
                                                 
44  On the co-existence of sources of law, see, for example G. Calabresi, A Common Law for 
the Age of Statutes, (Cambridge/Ms.: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
45  The impossibility for a legal system to serve two masters was addressed by Hans Kel-
sen with his famous Bible quotation from Matthew VI, 24 (to be found in: H. Kelsen, 
Reine Rechtslehre 330 (2nd ed. 1960, Vienna: Manz). 
46  Case C-336/03, ECJ of 10/3/2005. 
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(2) Specific co-ordination problems 
Alongside these general problems, one may describe a set of specific co-
ordination problems between European and national law in more detail.47 
From the outset, the interplay of European and national law is burdened by the 
unclear relationship among directive-conforming interpretation of national law 
and the direct applicability of directives.48 In principle, it has long been recog-
nised that among private parties, there is no direct “horizontal” effect of direc-
tives, but that only the directive-conforming interpretation of national law 
within the limits of national interpretation rules (the wording being the most 
important limitation) is possible; in the event that these limits are exceeded, 
there is a state liability claim. However, the ECJ has frequently asked national 
courts for intérpretation conforme even where they did not have the interpreta-
tive leeway to do so. One may read in this sense cases such as von Colson,49 
Marleasing,50 Faccini Dori,51 Ruiz Bernaldez52 and Océano.53 To complicate 
the picture further, the ECJ has, in some other constellations, accepted direct 
horizontal effect, namely, in the case of unfair competition provisions54 and 
statal prohibitions which render the performance of a contract impossible.55 
This uncertainty is all the more regrettable as private citizens may risk the 
sanctions foreseen for the violation of national law when relying on the direct 
application of European directive provisions. 
Another co-ordination problem lies in the division of the jurisdiction of 
European and national courts in interpretation and gap filling, in particular, in 
the “concretisation” of general clauses.56 Whereas no limits of ECJ jurisdiction 
                                                 
47  Ch. Schmid, supra 15, 622 et seq. 
48  Ch. Schmid, supra 15, 623 et seq. 
49 Case 14/83, von Colson, ECR 1984, 1891. 
50 Case 106/89, Marleasing, ECR 1990, I-4135. 
51 Case 91/92, Faccini Dori, ECR 1994, I-1281. 
52 Case C-129/94, Ruiz Bernaldez, I-1829. 
53 Cases C-240/98 - C-244/98, Océano, ECR 2000, I-4941. For more details on theses 
cases, see Ch. Schmid, supra 15, 626 et seq. 
54 Case C-194/94, CIA Security, ECR 1996, I-2201. 
55  See Case 150/88, Glockengasse, ECR 1989, 3891; Case C-443/98, Unilever, ECR 
2000, I-7535. On this line of cases see J. Gundel, “Neue Grenzlinien für die Direkt-
wirkung nicht umgesetzter EG-Richtlinien unter Privaten”, (2001) EuZW at 143, and 
Ch. Schmid, supra 15, 634 et seq. 
56  See, on this topic, W.-H. Roth, Generalklauseln im Europäischen Privatrecht, (FS 
Drobnig, Tübingen: Mohr, 1998) at 137; J. Basedow, Der Bundesgerichtshof, seine 
Rechtsanwälte und die Verantwortung für das europäische Privatrecht, (FS Brandner, 
Köln: Dr. Otto Schmidt) at 651; O. Remien, “Die Vorlagepflicht bei Auslegung unbe-
stimmter Rechtsbegriffe”, (2002) 66 RabelsZ at 503; I. Wolff, Die Verteilung der 
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are foreseen in the Treaty, they have nevertheless been recommended in the 
literature, and, in some cases, have even been accepted by the ECJ. For exam-
ple, the unfairness of contractual clauses was exhaustively scrutinised by the 
ECJ in the Oceano57 and the Cofidis58 Cases, but left to national courts in the 
Freiburger Kommunalbauten59 Case – probably also in the light of the ECJ’s 
lack of capacity to deal with the potential flood of submissions of this kind. 
However, it is not clear how the different cases may be meaningfully distin-
guished. Instead, it seems that the issue of the “concretisation competence” 
should not be separated from the “content of concretisation”, i.e., the specific 
substantive law answer. 
Alongside general clauses, there are also problems of cumulative applica-
tion and pre-emption in the interplay of European and national private law.60 
The dilemma in these cases lies in the fact that, on the one hand, concurring 
national norms may negatively affect the effectiveness of European norms by 
stipulating additional conditions, while, on the other, European norms are, in 
the first place, generally incapable of deploying effectiveness without being 
appropriately co-ordinated und supplemented by national norms. Issues of cu-
mulative application or pre-emption may be stipulated by conflict of laws 
norms contained in European directives – a prominent case being minimum 
harmonisation clauses – failing which they need to be developed on a case-to-
case basis by the ECJ. To quote a prominent example, problems of cumulative 
application of European and national sources had to solved by the ECJ in a se-
ries of Product Liability Cases. In comparison to most consumer contract law 
directives, the 1985 Product Liability Directive61 does not contain a minimum 
harmonisation clause, though most commentators read such a clause into it on 
account of its framework character and the large number of gaps.62 However, 
                                                                                                                                                      
Konkretisierungskompetenz für Generalklauseln in privatrechtsgestaltenden Richtli-
nien, (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2002); P. Rott, “What is the role of the ECJ in EC Private 
Law?” (2005) 1 Hanse Law Review at 5. 
57  Cases C-240/98 - C-244/98, Océano, ECR 2000, I-4941. 
58  Case C-473/00, Cofidis, ECR 2002, I-10875. In this case, the ECJ ruled that a French 
prescription period of 2 years for claims against abusive clauses hindered the effective 
application of the directive. Therefore, the case involved not only the general clause 
on unfairness but also the principle of effectiveness, specifically the effective imple-
mentation of European law provisos in national law. 
59  Case C-237/02, Freiburger Kommunalbauten, ECR I-3403. 
60  Ch. Schmid, supra 15, 655 et seq. 
61  Directive 85/374/EEC, OJEC 1985 (L 210) 29. 
62  See G. Brüggemeier, “Produkthaftung und Produktsicherheit”, (1988) 152 Zeitschrift 
für das gesamte Handelsrecht 511, at 531 & 534; G. Howells, “Product Liability – A 
History of Harmonisation”, in: A. Hartkamp et al. (eds.), Towards a European Civil 
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in three cases decided on 25/4/2002,63 the ECJ found that no minimum har-
monisation principle could be read into the directive in the light of its para-
mount goal of establishing uniform regulation of product liability – so as to 
prevent market distortions when undertakings in one Member State are forced 
to pay more to the victims of dangerous products than in others.64 
The inverse constellation of pre-emption is constituted by the fragmentation 
of national law, when national norms with a wide scope of application collide 
with European norms with a narrow scope of application.65 Such fragmenta-
tions may lead to European enclaves in national law when the national legisla-
tor introduces European segments into national provisions – as happened in the 
German transposition of the Unfair Terms Directive in § 310 para. 3 BGB and 
the Consumer Sales Directive in §§ 474-479 BGB. The alternative of an “over-
obligatory” implementation of European norms (extending them on a volun-
tary basis to the wider scope of application of national norms) leads to the dif-
ficult and controversial question of whether the ECJ is competent to decide 
even upon national segments of the implementation norm (which go beyond 
the scope of application of the provisions of the directive) if cases are referred 
to it (which is of course not prescribed by Art. 234 TEC). The Court has, with 
one exception,66 affirmed this question in its jurisprudence.67 
Finally, all these co-ordination problems are rendered worse by a particular 
instance of judicial self restraint of the ECJ. Indeed, when answering reference 
questions brought to it by national courts in the procedure under Article 234 
TEC, its interpretive perspective is strictly limited to European measures, 
without considering their (25 different!) private law surroundings and the ef-
fect that the combined application of European and national law may have in a 
specific case. It is, of course, true that the ECJ has no competence to interpret 
national law. However, when interpreting European law, it could very well 
take into account its national law surroundings and their interpretation by na-
tional courts, even though this would render its task much more difficult. This 
would actually be the only possibility for this court to engage in system-
                                                                                                                                                      
Code, (Demeter: Kluwer, 3rd ed., 2004). 
63 Case C-183/99, González Sánchez, ECR 2002, I-3901; Cases C-52/00, Commission vs. 
France, ECR 2002, I-3827 and C-154/00, Commission vs. Greece, ECR 2002, I-3879. 
64 This jurisprudence has been confirmed recently in Case C-402/03, Skov, of 10/1/2006, 
nyr. 
65  See Ch. Schmid, supra 15, 667 et seq. 
66  Case 346/93, Kleinworth Benson, ECR 1995, I-615. 
67  See C-306/99, Banque Internationale pour l’Afrique Occidentale SA (BIAO), ECR 
2003, I-1; this decision has been taken against the well motivated contrary opinion by 
AG Jacobs (no. 40-71). 
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building in the European multilevel regime in private law – which does not de-
serve the term “system” in its present state. 
c) Conclusion 
Whereas every decision in European constitutional law may reinforce the 
overall system and “weave its patches ever tighter”, this potential is barely ex-
istent in private law. Its division into the European and national sources which 
make up a multi-level regime, coherence problems within European sources as 
well as in the interplay between European and national sources render the 
gradual formation of a system and, consequently, system-oriented adjudica-
tion, hardly possible. This is plausibly shown by the fact that most ECJ cases 
in private law concern the delimitation of the scope of application of European 
directives, i.e., decisions which do not generate meaningful systematic gains. 
2. Judicial Method and Interpretative Meta-principles 
Other important differences attach to the field of judicial method. For present 
purposes, this may be divided into two phenomena: first, the interpretative 
tools in use; second, the “background agenda” pursued by a court which may 
be rephrased as “interpretative metaprinciples”. 
Regarding the first category, the ECJ essentially resorts to traditional meth-
ods of interpretation also used in the Member States, but attaches a somewhat 
different weight to them.68 Grammatical, systematical, and historical interpre-
tation are, of course, used, but teleological interpretation is often the most im-
portant method. It is geared towards the famous “effet utile” principle accord-
ing to which the Court seeks to achieve the maximum of practical effectiveness 
of European law. Inspired by the model of the French Conseil d’Etat, the 
ECJ’s way of argumentation is usually quite succinct and formalistic, and 
leaves little space for discussion – drawing, as it were, on the legal formalist 
fallacy that the answers to all legal questions are already contained in the text 
of the law, and only need to be identified and applied by the interpreter.69 Ap-
parently, the ECJ never openly reflects on the political dimension of its deci-
                                                 
68  See J. Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993); K.-H. Ladeur, “Methodology and European Law – an Me-
thodology Change so as to Cope with the Multiplicity of the Law?”, in: M. van 
Hoecke (ed.), Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law, (Oxford: Hart, 
2004) at 91 et seq.; specifically on European private law, see A. Flessner, “Juristische 
Methode und europäisches Privatrecht”, (2002) JZ at 14. 
69  See, for a survey, F. Schauer, “Formalism”, (1988) 97 Yale L.J. at 509. 
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sions, let alone their political, social and economic consequences.70 This, 
again, reflects a widespread formalist conviction according to which the le-
gitimacy of law is threatened if it does not draw a clear borderline from poli-
tics. And yet, this borderline is, itself, a fallacy as the political dimension of 
adjudication has always been, and still is, undeniable. Thus, denying it may be 
politically understandable, but is, to say the least, methodologically dishonest. 
Notwithstanding this silence of/on the part of the Court, it is by examining 
the development of its jurisprudence over years that one may find meta-
principles at an abstract level, which reflect the Court’s more general agenda. 
As such principles are never explicated, it is unclear to what extent the Court 
pursues them actively and reflectedly, or whether they instead constitute a se-
cret master plan (“geheimer Entwurf” in the words of Franz Wieacker71) which 
may remain hidden, even to the judges themselves, by the official formalistic 
methodology, and becomes visible only in a scientific reconstruction of the 
decade-long evolution of the case law. 
a) Constitutional law 
The building up of a European constitutional system was enabled by coherent 
meta-principles, in other words, a sound overall design of the structural and 
substantive constitution. In the former, the guiding principle may be labelled 
“approximation towards a federal system”. Yet, to achieve this, an explicit 
choice in favour of, let alone a political debate on, a federal Europe was not 
necessary and never took place.72 Instead, the “federalisation” of Europe was 
simply achieved by the effective application of direct effect and supremacy 
combined with the judicial device of the preliminary reference procedure. This 
led to the effective implementation of European law before national courts by 
interested private parties – whereas, under traditional international law, no 
comparable tools existed, and the non-compliance of a Member State could 
only be found by a judicial body ex post and, at best, give rise to liability. 
The ECJ’s approach in the substantive constitution is more complex. The 
two most important baselines are, on the one hand, an activist, expansionist 
approach, and, on the other, a more reticent, “procedural-balancing” one. 
                                                 
70  On consequence-oriented interpretation in general, see M. Deckert, Folgenorientie-
rung in der Rechtsanwendung, (München: Beck, 1995); K.-H. Ladeur, “Methodendis-
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71  F. Wieacker, Industriegesellschaft und Privatrechtsordnung, (Neudruck: Fischer: 
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72  On the following, see J.H.H. Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe”, (1991/1992) 
100 Yale L.J. at 2423. 
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These will now be sketched out in the area of the basic freedoms. 
aa) Constitutional activism 
The complement of the federalisation of the structural constitution through di-
rect effect and supremacy was the upgrading of the free trade provisions into 
subjective rights. These became constitutional-like basic freedoms and covered 
not only all forms of discrimination but also simple restrictions, and were fi-
nally extended horizontally among private parties. The interpretation of the 
Treaty provisions on competition law similarly elevated them to basic tenets of 
an economic constitution. This prohibited not only private distortions of com-
petition, but – in its so-called “public turn” which started in the late 1980ies – 
also extended to distortions brought about by the state – i.e., by monopolies, 
exclusivity rights or the tolerance or even promotion of private anti-
competitive behaviour.73 Whereas the Court generally followed an expansion-
ist agenda, both in the structural and the substantive constitution, there have 
also been occasional steps backward, which are, however, mainly about cor-
recting former excessive expansions – as, for example, the famous limitation 
of the scope of application of the free movement of goods (Article 28 TEC) in 
the Keck74 decision, or, in competition law, the rule of reason doctrine, which 
excludes certain agreements from the scope of Article 81 para. 1 TEC, thus 
rendering an individual or block exemption under Article 81 para. 3 TEC su-
perfluous.75 
bb) Substantive core and procedural “halo” 
A second methodological metaprinciple in the jurisprudence on the basic free-
doms may be called rational balancing. It applies when the basic freedoms 
conflict with national provisions without protectionist orientation (such as the 
classic tariffs and quantitative restrictions), but serve a different regulatory ob-
jective, typically non-trade issues, and may, nevertheless, negatively affect the 
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freedom rights and thus be qualified as a measure of equivalent effect. Techni-
cally, such cases are either about an exemption from the scope of application 
of the freedom rights or the application of the proportionality test. In sub-
stance, one may find a two-tier structure in such cases. At the first level, there 
is the mandatory hard core of the freedom rights which corrects “nation state 
failures”, such as protectionism or other forms of discrimination or excessive 
limitation of the legal position of foreigners.76 Beyond this substantive core, 
there is a kind of procedural “halo” within which the basic freedoms no longer 
determine the content of national regulation, but only mandate a rational bal-
ancing process within which Member States are supposed to give good reasons 
if they want to uphold regulations which negatively affect a European freedom 
right. Rational balancing understood in this sense favours innovation, rationali-
sation and deliberation of adequate solutions. This trend may be detected in a 
long line of case law reaching from Cassis to more recent cases, such as 
Altmark Trans.77 
In private law, the most famous case one may read along these lines is 
probably the Centros78 judgment. In this case, a Danish couple was allowed, 
by drawing on the freedom of establishment, to escape Danish social capital 
requirements on private limited companies by establishing an English com-
pany and then founding a Danish branch from which all the commercial activ-
ity of the company was carried out. As the ECJ implied – both in this and in 
later cases – that a company is subject to the law of its place of incorporation 
(Gründungstheorie), these cases were frequently read as an example of benefi-
cial regulatory competition close to a “European Delaware effect” in which the 
most efficient company law would win the race.79 But there is a slightly differ-
ent alternative interpretation:80 the ECJ did not deny Denmark’s right to enact 
mandatory corporate regulation. However, Denmark was required to give good 
reasons to explain why its restrictions on the establishment of a branch of Eng-
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lish-style private limited companies, including the provisions on minimum 
capital, were conducive to its alleged regulatory objective of creditor protec-
tion. As Denmark did not refuse the registration of a branch of English-style 
private limited companies in general, but did so only in the present case in 
which the company had no commercial activity at its place of incorporation (a 
fact which is completely irrelevant to creditor protection in Denmark), its ap-
proach was found to be inconsistent and therefore in breach of the proportion-
ality principle. As a result, the Danish regulation was not forbidden uncondi-
tionally, but only because it lacked an adequate and reasonable justification. 
All in all, the meta-principle called the substantive core and procedural “halo” 
here seems to enable a well-tuned and balanced co-ordination of European and 
national law. 
b) Private law 
Moving back to the field of private law, whilst there are few specificities re-
garding the use of methods of interpretation, the search for meta-principles is 
more difficult. At an abstract level, classic private law in the continental tradi-
tion may be ascribed to the meta-principle of the realisation of a constitution of 
free and equal citizens, which, in Germany, even pre-dated the political consti-
tution. Due to the instrumentalist character of European private law, not even 
that abstract meta-principle may be claimed to exist to the same degree at 
European level. Instead, the basic, perhaps frustrating, thesis to be expounded 
here is that no general vision of the ECJ being capable of materialising in in-
terpretative meta-principles exists. What remains is a kind of “schematic effet 
utile” (aa) which has been counteracted in the more recent past by tendencies 
of formalistic self restraint which may even go against the effet utile of single 
European instruments (bb). These incertitudes are complemented by the often 
bad technical quality of private law decisions (cc). 
aa) “Schematic effect utile” means that the Court tries to maximise the prac-
tical effectiveness of EC law, without adequately reflecting upon its systematic 
embeddedness in its national law environment and the overall objective of pri-
vate law justice. This phenomenon reflects what has been referred to above as 
the one-sided teleology of European legislation and perpetuates it at the level 
of interpretation. This tendency may be shown with the Court’s consumer 
model. Given its preponderance within European private law, consumer pro-
tection might be expected to provide an overarching interpretative meta-
principle. However, it may be shown that the Court does not pursue a coherent 
consumer model. This thesis may be illustrated by referring to its interpretation 
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of consumers’ information rights.81 Clearly, there is absolutely nothing wrong 
with information rights in themselves. As both economic analysis and contract 
practice show, information asymmetries among professional traders and con-
sumers are a frequent type of market failure, which information rights are able 
to correct in many cases.82 In line with this basic finding, information rights 
constitute the most prominent and frequent regulatory tool in European con-
sumer law. This seems to be inspired by the model of an inadequately in-
formed consumer who is able to take rational decisions only after adequate in-
formation. Thus, to quote but one example, in the recent Cofidis case,83 the 
ECJ quashed national time-limits which restrict the exercise of consumer pro-
tection rights on the grounds that consumers may ignore their rights com-
pletely, but needed to be protected all the same. 
Conversely, as regards national information rights, these are often found by 
the ECJ to be inconsistent with the four market freedoms on proportionality 
grounds.84 In particular, in the field of misleading advertising, national infor-
mation rights requiring clear and unambiguous information are treated restric-
tively. In what boils down to an unrealistic assumption about market behav-
iour, consumers are, for example, supposed to recognise objectively incorrect 
manipulative advertising statements85 and foreign-language labels which are 
similar to well-known domestic products.86 In this jurisprudence, we seem to 
face the different model of a well-informed and intelligent consumer. As a re-
sult, consumer information requirements are widely construed in European 
consumer contract law, whereas national consumer protection-based limita-
tions on the basic freedoms in national unfair competition law are construed 
narrowly. However, this distinction is by no means justifiable under private 
law, as – in the words of Stefan Grundmann – one should not require a lower 
degree of attention from a consumer entering into contractual negotiations than 
from a consumer reading advertisements in his armchair.87 
                                                 
81  The following analysis draws on Ch. Schmid, “The Instrumentalist Conception of the 
Acquis Communautaire in Consumer Law and its Implications on a European Con-
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The background of this jurisprudence seems to be that national consumer 
protection instruments, including information obligations, have been recog-
nised as valid limitations of the basic freedoms in the famous Cassis de Di-
jon88 jurisprudence. Therefore, a wide recognition of national information 
rights would reduce the effet utile of the market freedoms. At the end of the 
day, the different treatment of national and European information rights shows 
that the ECJ’s true concern is not a uniform model of a consumer, and not even 
consumer protection as such, but the optimisation of Community law irrespec-
tive of its contents and objectives. Thus, a coherent vision of consumer infor-
mation, in particular, and private law, in general, is sacrificed to a “schematic 
effet utile” concept. Obviously, such a concept prevents private law from ade-
quately fulfilling its core task of realising justice between the parties. 
Moreover, the fact that, within the “schematic effet utile” orientation of the 
ECJ, the national law surroundings of EC law are not considered may ulti-
mately lead to the paradoxical result that the combined application of EC and 
national law in a given specific case does not promote the effet utile of the ap-
plicable European legislation. A pertinent example of this constellation is pro-
vided by the 2002 Product Liability cases already referred to above, in which 
the Court had to ascertain whether a minimum harmonisation clause should be 
read into the directive or not. As previously mentioned, most commentators 
read such a clause into it on account of its framework character and the large 
number of gaps.89 This is fully plausible as the fragmentary texture of the di-
rective cannot reasonably be expected to do justice to this complex and so-
cially highly-sensitive matter which is governed by different national regula-
tory traditions.90 However, as also mentioned, in the three cases decided on 25 
April 2002,91 the ECJ found that no minimum harmonisation principle could 
be read into the directive in the light of its paramount goal of establishing uni-
form liability conditions for European enterprises so as to prevent market dis-
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tortions.92 In doing so, the ECJ deprived a Spanish plaintiff, whose health had 
been seriously affected by the transfusion of infected blood in a public hospi-
tal, of a claim for damages against the hospital existing under a Spanish prod-
uct liability statute.93 The reason for this was that – unlike under Spanish law, 
which followed US law in this respect – the victim can only sue the producer 
of the defective product, but in general another member in the commercial 
chain – such as the hospital which had not produced the infected blood itself in 
this case. This jurisprudence is very unfortunate in that it sacrifices national 
consumer protection without even apportioning any visible gain for European 
industries. Indeed, the narrow scope of application of the European directive 
and its many gaps render its effet utile to provide European undertakings with a 
uniform product liability regime absolutely illusory.94 As a result, the ECJ has, 
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tive which has made it an attractive model for legislators worldwide, who want to 
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in this case, petrified a nearly 20 year old piece of legislation already infused 
with massive shortcomings. In doing so, it prevents Member States from ade-
quately fulfilling their responsibilities of providing industry and consumers 
with a socially and economically adequate and consistent product liability law. 
bb) Alongside what is called schematic effet utile here, the ECJ has, in re-
cent years, also practised, with no clear distinction from from effet utile “ex-
pansionism” being possible, a kind of formalistic self-restraint. This is cer-
tainly motivated by the idea of limiting the number of references in private 
law. In addition, the conviction may also exist on the part of the court that the 
responsibility for private law systems remains with the national legislator, 
whilst the European input is still limited to selective interventions. 
A pertinent example for this tendency of self-restraint is provided by AG 
Légers opinion in the so-called Heininger follow-up cases of Schulte and 
Crailsheimer Volksbank.95 In Heininger, the ECJ had acknowledged the appli-
cability of the Doorstep Sales Directive to real credit transactions, which gives 
buyers the right to revoke the credit agreement. The economically crucial issue 
here concerned the destiny of the contract on the purchase of the house and the 
provision of a mortgage following the cancellation of the credit agreement. 
The German Federal Highcourt found that the latter did not affect the former 
(no “verbundene Geschäfte”).96 This rather formalistic and wholesale obiter 
dictum was convincingly criticised in the literature.97 Indeed, if confined to the 
credit contract, the right of cancellation is not worth a great deal, as the con-
sumer’s debt for the purchase of the house remains; the only effective remedy 
would be to transfer the house to the bank in return for the credit, as is actually 
possible in German law in such interconnected transactions. In addition, the 
banks involved had often financed up to 100 per cent of the selling price, 
thereby giving the investors the impression that the price was market-oriented 
and that the whole deal had been checked by the banks and had been approved 
as economically reasonable – which comes very close to the requirements for-
mulated in other court decisions for the assumption of “interconnected transac-
tions” in the above sense. Against this background, the BGH decision certainly 
amounted to a tremendous relief for the involved banks, as they would other-
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wise have received thousands of hardly marketable flats in return for their 
credits. However, effective consumer protection had not been achieved in this 
case. This dubious jurisprudence of the BGH has, however, been accepted by 
AG Léger.98 In his opinions, he emphasises that Article 7 of the Directive, ac-
cording to which “the legal effects of such renunciation shall be governed by 
national laws” is unambiguous and leaves no scope for interpretation. The con-
cept of practical effect would not be used by the Court on every occasion, but 
only when the provision in question is open to several interpretations. As a re-
sult the BGH can, according to the AG, freely decide on national law conse-
quences, and apparently is not even bound by the two usual minimum provisos 
for national implementation of EC law, the non-discrimination and the effec-
tiveness principles. However, this result is not acceptable in this commenta-
tor’s view. First, the argument of AG Léger is not convincing, as there are nu-
merous cases in which the ECJ went far beyond the wording of European pro-
visions – for examples, it is sufficient to think of the Direct Effect and the State 
Liability doctrines. What is more important, the present “consumer trap” – i.e., 
the danger for the consumer of incurring substantial financial losses with the 
exercise of consumer protection rights – is incompatible not only with the effet 
utile of the Doorstep Sales Directive, but also with both European and national 
constitutional principles. This does, in effect, constitute a nation state failure 
which legitimizes European intervention. Fortunately enough, in its recent 
judgment, the ECJ has, against its AG, paid heed to these arguments and found 
the German provisions and case law to be in violation of the directive – only, 
however, to the extent that the information obligations laid down by the direc-
tive have not been respected.99 Even though the ECJ has thus avoided the 
worst consequences for consumers, similar instances of adverse self-restraint 
may still be found in other cases such as Rabobank.100 
cc) The incertitude about effet utile-oriented activism and self-restraint is 
complemented by the often poor technical quality of private law decisions. In-
deed, the latter is often even worse than that of constitutional law decisions, in 
which the ECJ has gained a high degree of expertise since the beginning of the 
Communitity. This assessment is first motivated by the limited, or mainly non-
existent, systematic gains of private law decisions and by the ECJ’s refusal to 
take the national law context into account. Beyond this, however, it is becom-
ing increasingly clear that judges are also quite simply overtaxed by the uni-
versal competence of the Court in all areas of Community law – from customs 
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law via constitutional law to private law. One pertinent example from private 
law of a manifest judicial error is the Dietzinger101 Case. Here, the ECJ had to 
delimit the scope of the Doorstep Sales Directive. By doing so, the Court in-
terpreted the so-called principle of “accessoriness” (the cogent nexus between 
the debt to be guaranteed and the validity of the guarantee contract) in a 
teleologically absurd way:102 the son would only have been allowed to revoke 
the guarantee agreement concluded by himself under doorstep conditions if the 
father had engaged into the main contract under doorstep conditions as well – 
as if an insane surety could only invoke the invalidity of the guarantee contract 
if the principal debtor was insane, too.103 No comment. 
c) Conclusion  
All in all, the ECJ’s methodological approach in private law lacks coherent 
orientation towards any interpretative meta-principle. Its usual preference for 
effet utile-oriented decisions is increasingly coupled with formalistic judicial 
self-restraint, with no clear distinction between the two approaches. Conse-
quently, legal certainty suffers as ECJ decisions are difficult to predict. This 
incertitude is further exacerbated by the often bad/poor technical quality of 
private law decisions. On all these grounds, European court decisions in pri-
vate law may be said to enjoy little methodological legitimacy. 
3. The effects on private parties 
Further differences between constitutional and private law exist with regard to 
the factual consequences of decisions on private parties. In both fields, access 
to justice problems, in particular, the now excessive length of the reference 
procedure of about 2 years, needs to be criticised. The importance of the fa-
mous slogan “justice delayed is justice denied” can hardly be overstated. Yet, 
even against this negative background, one may find meaningful differences 
with regard to the effect of constitutional and private law decisions on private 
parties. 
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a) Constitutional law 
The majority of both private and constitutional law cases originate from pre-
liminary reference procedures, though other forms of actions, such as treaty 
infringement procedures against a Member State by the Commission, or nullity 
actions of national governments against European law acts, have also played 
an important role. The most famous constitutional law cases – to name but van 
Gend,104 Costa vs. Enel,105, Simmenthal,106 Cassis de Dijon107 – result from 
the burdens imposed by national law on individuals, which were then attacked 
by the affected individuals on grounds of European law, in particular, on the 
four market freedoms. It is this particular feature which explains that access to 
justice problems seems to be somewhat less urgent and less severe here. In 
fact, in the most frequent instance of import duties or quantitative restrictions, 
these are typical public law burdens, which are motivated by rationales of dis-
tributive justice. Such burdens do not generally entail direct gains or advan-
tages for other individuals, which are repealed once the burden is abolished. In 
the main, there are, if any, only indirect disadvantages, such as the loss of mar-
ket shares when the products of a foreign competitor may be imported on bet-
ter conditions. Thus, in many, if not most, constitutional law cases, private par-
ties may only win, i.e., enhance their legal position as compared with national 
law. In the worst case, EU law does not trump national law, which continues to 
be applied – with which the parties had to reckon, anyway. Clearly, this state-
ment is not valid in all fields of constitutional law. For example, in competition 
law, whose basic tenets in Article 81f. TEC belong to the EU’s economic con-
stitutional law, the blockage of agreements among undertakings or mergers 
through pending procedures may entail considerable financial losses and thus 
lead to a factual denial of justice, too. 
b) Private law 
The situation in private law is similar to that in competition law. However, ac-
cess to justice problems may have more serious effects there. Typical private 
law cases deal with issues of commutative justice, which is essentially about 
the equivalence of claims (performance, damages, restitution, etc.) among the 
parties to a private law relationship, with contract and tort being the two prin-
cipal categories. In this situation, the gain of one party usually equals the loss 
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of the other. It follows that both parties are normally negatively affected by the 
delay of decisions. Indeed, the winner or loser is only known after the end of 
the procedure, and no party is able to rely on the results of the transaction be-
forehand. As a result, speedy conflict solution, which is an essential element 
and advantage of most Western European economies, is threatened, as the 
number and influence of ECJ decisions in private law increases. 
This situation is aggravated by what may be called the “ping-pong game” 
among European and national courts, which is the unavoidable consequence of 
the preliminary reference procedure. Under this procedure, the ECJ, similar to 
an expert witness, does not decide entire cases, but only makes a finding on 
those European law issues referred to it by the national court, after which the 
final decision must again be taken by the national court. The Heininger saga, 
referred to above, constitutes a particularly bad example of what may happen 
in this interplay of European and national courts. This case was pursued on 
three instances in national law – first instance, appeal108 and appeal on the 
grounds of law [revision] at the Federal Highcourt [BGH]). Whereas the Court 
of First Instance and the Court of Appeal did not check whether the contract 
was concluded in a doorstep situation, as the Doorstep Sales Directive had, in 
their view, been displaced by the Consumer Credit Directive, the Federal 
Highcourt was not sure about that result under European law and referred that 
question to the ECJ.109 The latter, however, assumed that the Doorstep Sales 
Directive had to be applied110 after which the Federal Highcourt annulled the 
lower court’s decision111 and referred the matter back to the Court of Ap-
peal.112 Here, for the first time, it was examined whether there had actually 
been a doorstep situation – and this question was answered in the negative 
sense. As a result, the whole procedure had become a castle in the air, the 
courts had in extensu dealt with a hypothetical question which turned out to be 
completely irrelevant for the solution of the case, and the parties had to wait 
for more than five years for a final decision! 
As a conclusion, it may therefore be stated that adverse effects on private 
parties arising out of delays and co-ordination problems among European and 
national courts are particularly worrying in private law. 
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4. Overall conclusion 
Taken together, this analysis shows that the current type of adjudication in 
European private law is generally defective. This is so on account of its frag-
mentary and inconsistent systematic structures and on account of the co-
ordination problems among European and national sources, which do not pro-
vide the necessary preconditions for judicial system-building, the lack of a co-
herent interpretative meta-principle on the part of the ECJ (which oscillates be-
tween effet utile maximisation and formalistic judicial self-restraint) and, fi-
nally, pressing access to justice problems, which are mainly due to the exces-
sive length and the “ping-pong” character of the preliminary reference proce-
dure as well as the often poor technical quality of ECJ decisions in private law. 
III.  An Alternative Constitutional Metaprinciple for Judicial 
Governance in European Private Law 
In the face of the problems outlined above, it becomes clear that a completely 
new approach to judicial governance in European private law is necessary. 
This new approach should first be guided by the insight that the ECJ cannot be 
the appropriate actor for doctrinal fine-tuning in the European multilevel sys-
tem. As we have seen, due to the fragmentary state of European private law 
and its self-imposed limitation of not considering the national law context of 
European provisions, the ECJ is not capable of system-building and system-
oriented adjudication. This becomes particularly clear from the fact that most 
ECJ decisions are (only) about delimiting the scope of application of European 
instruments, from which very little systematic gain may be derived. Also, it 
should be considered that doctrinal fine-tuning – with the result that each case 
might be resolved exhaustively and uniformly at European level – may cause 
legitimacy problems, in that the persisting social, political and economic dif-
ferences between the Member States could not be taken into account ade-
quately. 
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Against this background, it would be wise were the ECJ to act not as an or-
dinary private law court, but as a constitutional court in private law. This 
would mean that it should apply something similar to its constitutional law 
“substantive core and procedural halo” approach, described above, to private 
law, too. To this end, it should – in a first step – not only challenge “nation 
state failures”, in particular, the violation of freedom and equality rights and 
the shifting of externalities of one’s own action to neighbours (“beggar my 
neighbour politics”), but also challenge self-evident irrational or inefficient in-
stances of national governance which harm national citizens in their status as 
European citizens. Thus, contrary to the opinion of AG Léger in the Schulte 
and Krailheimer Volksbank Cases, the possibility that a consumer may incur 
his or her financial ruin by exercising a European consumer protection right 
(!), i.e., the revocation right laid down in the Doorstep Sales Directive, consti-
tutes an instance of nation state failure which should trigger European inter-
vention. Equally, the interventions against unfair national procedural require-
ments in the Océano and Cofidis Cases may be justified on account of com-
mon European standards of due process, which belong, as it were, to the Euro-
pean constitutional acquis. 
However, beyond this substantive hard core, the ECJ should leave doctrinal 
fine-tuning (which involves connecting single decisions to an overall system) 
to national courts, and limit itself to “procedural framework-setting”, which 
includes instigating and monitoring learning and rationalisation processes in 
national law. This approach should, at the very least, prevail and, indeed, con-
tinue to prevail as long as the current fragmented state of European private law 
persists and judicial system-building is hardly possible. In this sense, one may 
welcome instances of judicial self-restraint, such as the Dietzinger case. Even 
though the Court’s technical reasoning in this case was, as shown, very much 
worthy of criticism, it is plausible that the credit markets on the one hand, and 
the public and private law instruments protecting sureties and creditors on the 
other, are still so different that completely uniform adjudication might lead to 
socially inadequate, and therefore illegitimate, results. Equally, the decision in 
the Freiburger Kommunalbauten Case, in which the determination of abusive 
standard terms in contracts lacking any European implications was left to na-
tional courts is fully plausible from this constitutional perspective approach. 
However, single “hits” of a convincing approach by the ECJ are not sufficient. 
It would, instead, be necessary for the ECJ to become aware of the differences 
of European constitutional and private law and tune its general approach ac-
cordingly. In summary, it is by behaving like a constitutional court for private 
law that the ECJ might replicate its constitutional law success story in that 
field.  
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